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context, the need to protect his right to rely on the statute of
frauds as a defense is eliminated, because neither the defendant
nor the court can be defrauded by the plaintiff.30 Moreover, a judi-
cial admission does not bar the defendant from contesting the va-
lidity or terms of the contract on other grounds."' It is submitted
that the purposes of the statute would be better served, and judi-
cial efficiency more effectively promoted, by giving full effect to the
judicial admissions exception to the statute of frauds.2
Colleen M. McIntosh
CPLR 4111: Special verdict answers do not require concurrence
by the same five jurors
Since 1937, New York has permitted verdicts in civil trials to
be rendered by five-sixths of the jury.' The authorizing statute
gill Inc., Commodity Mktg. Div. v. Hale, 537 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976). Defen-
dants should not be allowed to avoid admitted obligations in the name of preventing plain-
tiffs from perpetrating non-existent frauds. See Stevens, supra note 18, at 378.
30 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. "Undeniably, the purpose of the statute
was to give assured protection against the risk . . . of convincing proof through perjured
testimony of an agreement that had never actually been entered into." Stevens, supra note
18, at 360. A defendant will not admit the existence of a contract that he did not make, and,
therefore, it is suggested, once the contract is admitted the defendant should not be pro-
tected by the statute.
31 See N.Y. U.C.C. § 2-201, official comment 7, at 119 (McKinney 1964); Comment,
U.C.C. 2-201(3)(b): The Search for the "Bargain-in-Fact" Through the Use of the Oral
Admissions Exception of the U.C.C. and its Impact on Other Contract Areas, 3 J. L. &
COM. 167, 176 (1983); see also Packwood Elevator Co. v. Heisdorffer, 260 N.W.2d 543, 547
(Iowa 1977) (plaintiff has burden of proving contract actually exists); Dehahn v. Innes, 356
A.2d 711, 719-23 (Me. 1976) (litigating tender of delivery, acceptance, revocation, and dam-
ages); Oregon Ridge Dinner Theatre, Inc. v. Hamlin, 253 Md. 462, 467-68, 253 A.2d 382, 384
(1969) (litigating validity of transfer of assets).
2 The history of the statute of frauds clearly indicates that its purpose was to prevent
the enforcement of fraudulent claims. See Stevens, supra note 18, at 355-71. It is suggested
that because a party does not ordinarily admit a contractual obligation to which he was not
a party, it is reasonable to hold the party bound, to the extent that he admits the obligation.
"[S]ince the statute of frauds was intended to provide justice by reducing frauds, doing
away with the judicial admission exception to discourage perjury achieves justice in the
same way as legalizing criminal activities in order to reduce crime." Shedd, supra note 24, at
28 n.144.
I See CPLR 4113(a) (1963). The statute provides: "A verdict may be rendered by not
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does not distinguish between special verdicts2 and general ver-
dicts.3 Neither the New York Court of Appeals nor the legislature
less than five-sixths of the jurors constituting a jury." Id. Traditionally, most state constitu-
tions required unanimous jury verdicts and had to be amended to permit less-than-unani-
mous verdicts. See Note, Civil Juries: Recent Legislation Allowing Nonunanimous Ver-
dicts, 18 WASHBURN L.J. 269, 271 (1979). By 1970, a majority of the states had abolished the
unanimous-jury requirement. See Kronzer & O'Quinn, Let's Return to Majority Rule in
Civil Jury Cases, 8 Hous. L. REv. 302, 302 & n.1 (1970). New York amended its constitution
to permit non-unanimous jury verdicts in civil cases in 1935. See N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2;
FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. COUNCIL 41 (1935). Two years later, the New York legislature
enacted legislation to effect this change. See Ch. 120, [1937] N.Y. Laws 177 (codified at
CPLR 4113(a)(1963)). One of the primary justifications for the non-unanimous verdict is the
reduction of court congestion and the resultant delays. See Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super.
351, 356, 258 A.2d 379, 381 (1969); Measeck v. Noble, 9 App. Div. 2d 19, 21, 189 N.Y.S.2d
748, 750 (3d Dep't 1959); C. JOINE, CIVIL JUSTICE AND THE JURY 82 (1962); Comment, Vote
Distribution in Non-Unanimous Jury Verdicts, 27 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 360, 361 (1970).
Non-unanimous verdicts also serve to minimize the risk of compromise verdicts. See
Bounds, Civil Jury Verdicts-Let the Majority Rule, 30 ALA. L. REv. 227, 231 (1969). Addi-
tionally, the use of non-unanimous verdicts helps to "avoid unjust verdicts resulting from
dishonest and recalcitrant jurors." Comment, supra, at 361; accord Kronzer & O'Quinn,
supra, at 307-08.
See CPLR 4111(a) (1963). A special verdict is defined as "one in which the jury finds
the facts only, leaving the court to determine which party is entitled to judgment thereon."
Id. This definition was substantially the same at common law. See Carr v. Carr, 52 N.Y. 251,
255 (1873); Anderson v. Anderson, 103 Misc. 427, 428, 170 N.Y.S. 612, 613 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1918).
Special verdicts were originally created to allow the jury to leave all determinations of
law to the court, and thus avoid "the danger of punishment arising from [juror] mistakes in
dealing with (the] law." See Note, Special Verdicts: Rule 49 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 483, 485 (1964). The special verdict has been retained in modem
procedures in order to give the court more control over the application of legal principles.
Id. at 486. Special verdicts are particularly useful in cases in which the jury fails to consider
a material issue of fact. See 8 CARMODY-WAIT, New York Practice, § 58:11 (2d ed. 1966).
CPLR 4111(b) allows the court to resolve omitted issues of fact in accordance with the
jury's answers. See CPLR 4111(b) (1963); SIEGEL § 399, at 522-23 (1978). The court should
phrase legal questions underlying special verdicts narrowly to reduce the risk that jurors will
fail to understand the issues. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253,
259 (1920) (juror "who has never studied ... [the law] cannot understand or appreciate its
intricacies").
3 See CPLR 4111(a) (1963). The trial court may request a special or general verdict
from the jury. See id.; Johnson v. Art Kraft Strauss Sign Corp., 45 App. Div. 2d 482, 483,
359 N.Y.S.2d 773, 774 (1st Dep't 1974). A general verdict is defined as "one in which the
jury finds in favor of one or more parties." CPLR 4111(a) (1963). It becomes a conclusory
finding by the jury in favor of a party, see SIEGEL § 399, at 522, and is not subject to division
or examination of its component parts, see Murphy v. Roger Sherman Transfer Co., 62
Misc. 2d 960, 961, 310 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1970); Sunderland,
supra note 2, at 258; Comment, supra note 1, at 363-64.
To reach a general verdict, the jury must apply the law to the facts. See 4 WK&M %
4111.02. To make such an application, the jury receives detailed instructions on the law. See
id. The underlying assumption that the jury comprehends the law and is capable of apply-
ing it correctly is the subject of much criticism. See Finz, Does the Trend in Our Substan-
1985]
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has yet addressed the question of whether a special verdict con-
taining more than one answer requires the concurrence of the same
five jurors upon each answer.4 Recently, in Schabe v. Hampton
Bays Union Free School District,5 the Appellate Division, Second
Department, addressed this issue, holding that the concurrence of
any five jurors is sufficient to answer special verdict questions.6
In Schabe, a junior high school student was injured on school
property when she was struck by a school bus.7 The student com-
tive Law Dictate an Expanded Use Of the Special Verdict, 37 ALB. L. REV. 229, 235 (1973);
Sunderland, supra note 2, at 258-59. Even if the trial court properly charges the jury as to
the law, the charge may be "erroneous" if not understood by the jury. Finz, supra, at 235.
To ensure proper consideration of the issues by the jury, the court may invoke its dis-
cretionary authority to require the jury to return written answers to interrogatories along
with its general verdict. See CPLR 4111(c) (1963); Sherman v. Leicht, 238 App. Div. 271,
275, 264 N.Y.S. 492, 496 (4th Dep't 1933); 4 WK&M 4111.09. The answers to interrogato-
ries may facilitate more efficient appellate review. See Cid v. Bombardier Ltd., 91 App. Div.
2d 913, 913, 457 N.Y.S.2d 538, 539 (1st Dep't 1983); Quigley v. Suffolk County, 75 App. Div.
2d 888, 889, 428 N.Y.S.2d 46, 47 (2d Dep't 1980).
Several problems arise when the jury returns written answers to interrogatories with its
general verdict. See 4 WK&M 4111.10-.12. Because general verdicts are deemed con-
clusory, see SIEGEL § 399, at 522, all material issues are deemed to have been resolved in
favor of the successful party, see Elfeld v. Burkham Auto Renting Co., 299 N.Y. 336, 342, 87
N.E.2d 285, 288 (1949); Barker v. Cunard S.S. Co., 91 Hun 495, 498, 36 N.Y.S. 256, 258 (1st
Dep't 1895), afl'd, 157 N.Y. 693, 51 N.E. 1089 (1898). If one or more of the written answers
is inconsistent with the general verdict, see Aiello v. Wenke, 118 Misc. 2d 1068, 1079, 462
N.Y.S.2d 949, 955 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1983), the trial judge is authorized to enter
judgment consistent with the jury's answers rather than with the verdict, see CPLR 4111(c)
(1963). Alternatively, the court may allow the jury to reconsider the verdict. See CPLR
4111(c); Oakley v. City of Rochester, 71 App. Div. 2d 15, 17, 421 N.Y.S.2d 472, 474 (4th
Dep't), aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 908, 414 N.E.2d 966, 434 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1979).
' See Schabe v. Hampton Bays Union Free School Dist., 103 App. Div. 2d 418, 423, 480
N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (2d Dep't 1984). The question of whether the same jurors must agree to
all of the special verdict responses arises in negligence cases. See Fordes v. Ames, 93 Misc.
2d 723, 724, 401 N.Y.S.2d 965, 966 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1978); CPLR 4113, commentary
at 131 (McKinney Supp. 1984-1985). An apparent inconsistency may arise when a juror
votes against imposing liability on a party but concurs in an apportionment of damages that
includes the party. See Juarez v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 31 Cal. 3d 759, 762,
647 P.2d 128, 129, 183 Cal. Rptr. 852, 853 (1982); Fordes, 93 Misc. 2d at 724, 401 N.Y.S.2d
at 966. New York trial courts have disagreed as to whether unanimity is required by the
same five jurors on each answer to the special verdict questions. Compare Aiello v. Wenke,
118 Misc. 2d 1068, 1074, 1076, 462 N.Y.S.2d 949, 952, 954 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County
1983) (any five jurors can comprise majority on each answer) with Cohen v. Levin, 110 Misc.
2d 464, 468, 442 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1981) (unanimity required to
prevent "internally inconsistent voting"). Such conflicting holdings have occurred due to the
lack of an authoritative determination on this issue. See Schabe v. Hampton Bays Union
Free School Dist., 103 App. Div. 2d 418, 423, 480 N.Y.S.2d 328, 332 (2d Dep't 1984).
103 App. Div. 2d 418, 480 N.Y.S.2d 328 (2d Dep't 1984).
8 Id. at 427, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
7 Id. at 419-20, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 330. Upon dismissal from school, the plaintiff was wait-
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menced a negligence action against the school district, the high
school, the bus company, and the bus driver.8 At the close of trial,
the jury was given seven written questions and directed to find a
special verdict. 9 The trial judge instructed the jury that each ques-
tion of the special verdict required the vote of a five-sixths major-
ity, but that this majority could be comprised of any five jurors.'0
Inter alia, the jury found the school district negligent and the
plaintiff contributorily negligent, and apportioned fault between
them.1 Subsequent polling of the jury revealed that one juror who
had dissented on an issue of liability had nevertheless concurred in
the apportionment of fault.' 2 On appeal, the school district chal-
lenged the trial court's "any five" instructions. 3
In a unanimous decision, the Second Department upheld the
"any five" rule.' 4 Writing for the court, Presiding Justice Lazer ex-
amined the legislative reasons behind the abolishment of the unan-
imous jury requirement,15 and concluded that the adoption of the
ing to board one of several buses parked in the school driveway. Id. at 419, 480 N.Y.S.2d at
331. Plaintiff slipped while running across the driveway and was struck by a bus which had
been "waved on" by another driver. Id. at 419-20, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
6 Id. at 419, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 330. Prior to trial, the plaintiff settled with the bus com-
pany and the bus driver. Id. Though the settling parties did not participate in the trial,
their negligence remained at issue for the allocation of damages. Id.; see GOL § 15-108
(1978).
9 Schabe, 103 App. Div. 2d at 420, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 331. The first six special verdict
questions submitted to the jury addressed the negligence of each party and the related issue
of causation. Id. The seventh question required the jury to apportion the fault among the
parties. Id.
10 Id. The judge apparently relied on the New York pattern jury instructions, which
provide: "[flive of the six of you must agree on the answer to any question, but the same
five persons need not agree on all of the answers." 1 NEw YORK PATrERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIoNs-CVL § 1:97 (2d ed. Cum. Supp. 1983).
" See Schabe, 103 App. Div. 2d at 420-21, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
12 Id. Juror number one dissented to the majority's determination that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent, but approved the answer to the seventh question, which attributed
41% of the fault to the plaintiff. Id. at 421, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 331.
Is See id. at 419, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 330.
14 Id. at 427, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 335. In addition to the "any five" issue, the court deter-
mined that a verdict based on an instruction that requires a juror who dissents on one issue
to be bound by the majority's answer when analyzing subsequent issues is fatally deficient.
Id. at 428-29, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 336. The court emphasized "[t]he paramount importance of
maintaining the independence and intellectual integrity of each juror." Id. at 427-28, 480
N.Y.S.2d at 335.
15 Id. at 423, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33. The court resolved the "any five" issue by inter-
preting CPLR 4113 "in light of the legislative reasons that brought about [its] enactment."
Id., 480 N.Y.S.2d at 332. The court found that the unanimous jury requirement was abol-
ished in order to reduce court congestion and the risk of unjust verdicts, and to discourage
compromise verdicts. Id., 480 N.Y.S.2d at 333; accord FnRsT ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. CouNcL. 41
1985]
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"any five" rule furthers the legislative intent.16 The court empha-
sized the different roles played by general and special verdicts in
jury trials,17 explaining that unlike general verdicts, in which the
focus rests on the outcome of the case,'8 special verdicts focus only
on the resolution of specific questions. 19 Therefore, the court held
that although the requisite number of jurors must agree with the
entire result of a general verdict,20 nothing mandates that jurors
agree upon all of the separate and distinct issues presented in a
special verdict.21 The court noted that although the "validity of a
special verdict may depend on the jury's answers being consistent
enough for the entry of judgment. . . it does not depend upon the
consistency of individual juror voting patterns. 2 2 Finding nothing
in the law mandating such consistent voting on all issues, 23 the
court concluded that in the interest of "public policy and fairness,"
such a requirement should not be imposed.24
The Schabe decision represents the most comprehensive eval-
uation by a New York court of the "any five" issue. It is submitted
that by ascertaining the legislative reasons behind abolishing the
(1935).
16 See Schabe, 103 App. Div. 2d at 425, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
17 See id. at 425-26, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
-8 Id. at 425, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334; accord Murphy v. Roger Sherman Transfer Co., 62
Misc. 2d 960, 961, 310 N.Y.S.2d 891, 892 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1970). In Murphy, the
then requisite number of 10 of 12 jurors had agreed upon a general verdict. 62 Misc. 2d at
961, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 892. Because the same 10 jurors had not agreed on the issues of liabil-
ity and damages, see id., the trial judge invalidated the verdict, id. The Murphy case can be
distinguished from Schabe in that Murphy involved a general, rather than a special, verdict.
See id. See generally supra notes 2-3 (noting differences between general and special
verdicts).
19 Schabe, 103 App. Div. 2d at 425, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334. The Schabe court stressed the
limited function of the special verdict, reasoning that "a special verdict [is] not merely a
reflection of a general verdict split into parts, but [is] a device for returning the facts only."
Id.; see supra note 2.
20 Schabe, 103 App. Div. 2d at 425, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334; see supra note 3.
21 Schabe, 103 App. Div. 2d at 425, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334. The court found no support in
either the legislative history of CPLR 4111 or the statute itself compelling adherence to the
"identical five" rule. Id. at 425-26, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334.
22 Id. at 426, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334. The court reasoned that if the votes of each individ-
ual juror were scrutinized, the function of the special verdict would be frustrated, since the
number of mistrials and retrials would increase. Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 427, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 335. The Schabe court rejected the argument that the
"any five" rule permits inconsistent voting. Id. at 426, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 334. As long as any
five jurors agreed on each issue, there was no reason to seek "some greater symmetry on the
individual juror voting patterns." Id., 480 N.Y.S.2d at 335.
[Vol. 59:648
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unanimous jury requirement2" and applying them to the "any five"
rule,26 the court effected the true goal of the New York Legislature.
The abandonment of the unanimous-jury requirement mani-
fested the desire of the legislature to reduce court congestion and
produce fairer verdicts.2 7 After research and deliberation, 28 the leg-
islature decided that the concurrence of five out of six jurors would
serve these policy objectives without sacrificing fairness. 29 It is sub-
mitted that this degree of jury concurrence is achieved whenever
"any five" jurors agree upon an answer to a question within a spe-
cial verdict.
It is submitted that the "any five" rule is consistent with the
present bifurcated trial procedures.30 In bifurcated trials, the lia-
bility and damages issues are often decided by different jurors.3 1
Accordingly, the votes needed to sustain each verdict need not be
26 See id. at 423, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 332-33; infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text. A
statute should be interpreted in accordance with the intentions of the legislature and ap-
plied in accordance with its general purpose. See Petterson v. Daystrom Corp., 17 N.Y.2d
32, 38, 215 N.E.2d 329, 331, 268 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4 (1966). Such intent and purpose may be
ascertained from the legislative history of the statute. See Kruger v. Page Management Co.,
105 Misc. 2d 14, 24, 432 N.Y.S.2d 295, 303 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980).
26 See Schabe, 103 App. Div. 2d at 424-26, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 333-35; infra notes 27-29
and accompanying text.
27 See FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL 41 (1935). To support the proposed amend-
ment to the New York Constitution, the Council wrote:
The Council agrees with the argument that this proposed law, if enacted, will
have two beneficial effects: (1) it will lessen the economic loss of jury disagree-
ments; (2) it will result in a fairer expression of the jury's belief than under the
unanimous verdict requirement.
Id. Once the amendment was adopted, see N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 2, the Judicial Council sup-
ported legislation to effect this change, see THIRD ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL 34-35 (1937),
again, for the "economic saving to the State," id. at 35. The practical considerations of
reducing delays and mistrials are just as important today. See Aiello v. Wenke, 118 Misc. 2d
1068, 1076, 462 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1983) (adoption of practical
rule necessary to alleviate congested calendars); Desmond, Juries in Civil Cases-Yes or
No?, in THE JURY, SELECTED READINGS 17 (G. Winters ed. 1971) (problem with current court
congestion is "urgent").
28 See FIRST ANN. REP. N.Y. JuD. COUNCIL 41 (1937) (legislature considered "exhaustive
statistical and theoretical study").
29 See id. Before choosing the exact number of jurors necessary to reach a verdict, the
legislature examined constitutional, statistical, and theoretical issues. See id.
30 See CPLR 603 (1976) (allowing "bifurcation," or separate trials, of individual claims
or issues at court's discretion). Bifurcation saves time and money. See SmGEL § 130, at 514-
15. Typically, courts bifurcate the liability and damages issues in personal injury cases. Id.
31 See Mercado v. City of New York, 25 App. Div. 2d 75, 76, 265 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836-37
(1st Dep't 1966) ("[tlhe liability issue and the damage issue in an action, grounded in negli-
gence . . . represent distinct and severable issues which may be tried and determined
separately").
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rendered by the same five jurors.32 Therefore, the "any five" rule
ensures that the same degree of jury concurrence required in bifur-
cated trials will be attained in special verdict answers.3
A frequent argument against the "any five" rule is that it al-
lows individual jurors to cast irreconcilable votes.3 4 However, if the
same five jurors are required to agree on special verdict answers,
the dissent of a juror in one question requires the remaining five
jurors to agree unanimously on all other issues.3 5 Thus, many of
the problems with the unanimous jury requirement would be rein-
troduced, thereby frustrating the purpose of the less-than-unani-
mous verdict statute.3 6
32 See Murphy v. Roger Sherman Transfer Co., 62 Misc. 2d 960, 961, 310 N.Y.S.2d 891,
892 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1970). In Murphy, the court noted:
if the issues of liability and damages had been . . . tried separately (see CPLR
603) . . . any 10 jurors making for a valid verdict need not be the same with re-
spect to each of their votes on the separated issues of liability and damages.
Id. At the trial level, however, the issues were tried together, and because the court found
that the same jurors had not agreed on the issues of liability and damages, a new trial was
ordered. Id. This distinction has often been criticized as overtechnical. See Tillman v.
Thomas, 99 Idaho 569, 572, 585 P.2d 1280, 1283 (1978); Reed v. Cook, 103 N.Y.S.2d 539, 541
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1951); CPLR 4113, commentary at 131 (McKinney Supp. 1984-
1985)
33 See Aiello v. Wenke, 118 Misc. 2d 1068, 1077, 462 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (Sup. Ct. Catta-
raugus County 1983); Forde v. Ames, 93 Misc. 2d 723, 725, 401 N.Y.S.2d 965, 967 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1978); see also Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 555 P.2d 48, 55 (Okla.
1976) (same reasons justifying inconsistent jury votes in special verdict answers apply to
bifurcated trials).
34 See, e.g., Cohen v. Levin, 110 Misc. 2d 464, 469, 442 N.Y.S.2d 851, 854 (Sup. Ct
Queens County 1981). In Cohen, a medical malpractice suit was brought against two defen-
dants. Id. at 464, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 851. When the jury was polled, it was found that one juror
who had dissented from a finding of liability as to one defendant had agreed to an appor-
tionment of damages which included that defendant. Id. at 464-65, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 851-52.
The court reasoned that "[t]hese votes cannot be reconciled, and the court cannot choose
between them and sustain one of them. In the court's view, they must both be eliminated
from consideration." Id. at 469, 442 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
35 See Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super. 351, 355-56, 258 A.2d 379, 381 (1969);
Fleischhacker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 274 Wis. 215, 219-20, 79 N.W.2d 817, 820
(1956). A rule that renders a juror's votes impotent, "[is] an unwarranted and unreasonable
construction of the ... Constitution, [and] statute." Ward, 107 N.J. Super. at 356, 258 A.2d
at 381. A rule requiring the same five jurors to agree can invalidate an otherwise proper
verdict. See, e.g., Juarez v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 31 Cal. 3d 759, 768, 647
P.2d 128, 133, 183 Cal. Rptr. 852, 857 (1982) ("same five" rule undermines purposes of less-
than-unanimous verdict requirement); Measeck v. Noble, 9 App. Div. 2d 19, 21, 189
N.Y.S.2d 748, 750 (3d Dep't 1959) ("same five" rule fosters outdated unanimity
requirement).
" See Naumberg v. Wagner, 81 N.M. 242, 245, 465 P.2d 521, 524 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).
In Naumberg, the court criticized the "same five" rule because it reinstates a characteristic
of a unanimous verdict by requiring the same jurors to agree to each issue, id., and because
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
The failure of New York courts to consider the legislative his-
tory of the "any five" issue in prior decisions had resulted in incon-
sistent holdings.37 The Schabe court properly resolved the issue by
focusing on the legislative intent surrounding the creation of sec-
tion 4113, and, therefore, to avoid future inconsistencies, its deci-
sion should be adopted by either the New York Court of Appeals
or the legislature.
Michael J. McVicker
it attempts "to maintain the semblance of unanimity after the requirement of unanimity
ceases to exist," id. Similarly, New York courts have adopted the "any five" rule because it
supports the five-sixths jury rule. See, e.g., Aiello v. Wenke, 118 Misc. 2d 1068, 1076, 462
N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1983) (determining inconsistencies in votes
of individual jurors would undermine five-sixths rule); see also supra notes 26-28 and ac-
companying text (discussion of legislative intent behind abandonment of unanimous-jury
rule).
37 Compare Cohen v. Levin, 110 Misc. 2d 464, 467-68, 442 N.Y.S.2d 851, 852 (Sup. Ct.
Queens County 1981) (without addressing legislative history, court eliminated verdict that
"depend[ed] on a juror's internally inconsistent votes") with Aiello v. Wenke, 118 Misc. 2d
1068, 1076, 462 N.Y.S.2d 949, 954 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1983) ("any five" rule is
practical and essential in light of congested court calendars). The courts of other states that
have considered the legislative purpose behind less-than-unanimous jury verdicts consist-
ently have adopted the "any five" rule. See, e.g., Tillman v. Thomas, 99 Idaho 569, 572-73,
585 P.2d 1280, 1283-84 (1978); Ward v. Weekes, 107 N.J. Super. 351, 356, 258 A.2d 379, 380
(1969); Naumberg v. Wagner, 81 N.M. 242, 245, 465 P.2d 521, 524 (N.M. Ct. App. 1970).
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